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Closely following the organization last Summer of the bureau
of Comparative Law of the American Bar Association, comes
that recently accomplished at Brussels of "L'Institut de Droit
Comipar." The Minister of Justice of Belgium is the honorary
president and Dr. tmile Stocquart, who has been a collaborator of
Professor Dicey of Oxford, and is a well known writer on the
history of jurisprudence and institutional. government, is the
active president. Its object is to publish* a special bulletin at
frequent intervals, containing contributions by its active and
corresponding members, and translations into French of such of
the statutes of all countries as are deemed of special note.
The scope of the Institute, in repect to its field of work, is
somewhat broader than that of the "Socil de Ldgislation tran-
Ore" of Paris, and it hopes, by a system of international corres-
pondence, to be able to report the general progress of the world's
legislation with greater promptitude. Each, no doubt, will help
to spur on the other to better work.
Among the committee of organization of the new Institute
we note the names of M. Pholien of Brussels, the "premier avocat
g nral," Professor Vauthier of the university of that place, and
the "directeur au Ministare de la Justice," M. Hallewyck, who
has been specially delegated to this office by the Belgian govern-
ment.
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PUBLIC CONTROL OF AUTOMOBILES - EXTENT AND CONSTITUTION-
ALITY
That the law in its development to meet the needs of society,
keeps an almost equal pace with the progress of invention, is,
indeed, well illustrated in the assumption by the legislatures of
the various states, of the regulation and control of the use of
automobiles. Although otherwise governed by the same rules
which regulate the use of the road by other vehicles, yet because
of their peculiar appearance, the noise accompanying their loco-
motion, the rate of speed attainable by them, the manner of
locomotion, and the uncertainty of control, and because of the
danger therefore to life and property attendant upon their unre-
strained use of the streets, statutes and ordinances, for the
protection of the traveling public, have been passed regulating
the use by automobiles of the streets. At every turn the consti-
tutionality of such statutes and ordinances has been assailed, but
the courts, without exception, have upheld their validity on the
ground that public welfare necessitates such legislation.
In the recent case of State v. Swagerty, 102 S. W. (Mo.) 483,
the defendant was convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court of
St. Louis County, Missouri, of exceeding the speed limit provi-
ded for automobiles by statute, and fined. The Circuit Court,
on appeal, affirmed the judgment and the case was further
appealed.
The defendant insisted that the act upon which the prosecu-
tion was based is 'unconstitutional and void, in that it is a special
law and operates only upon automobiles and not upon all vehicles
using the public highways. He also insisted that the speed limit
is unreasonable (i) as it applies only to automobiles and (2)
because it is a speed less than that at which other vehicles and
even persons on horseback go.
The court, however, held that the law in question "does not
refer to particular persons or things of a class, and is, therefore,
a general and not a special law; that the act is a police regula-
tion and clearly within the power of the legislature to enact; and
that this court has nothing to do with the reasonableness of the
act, that being left to the legislature."
The judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed.
The fundamental reason for such legislation is the demand
therefor by the public welfare. All persons making use of the
streets are entitled to such a use thereof as is proper and as will
not interfere with the rights of others in an equal use thereof.
In other words the rights of all travelers on the highway are
reciprocal. Each is entitled to be free and unmolested in such
use except as he is subject to reasonable regulations of proper
authorities. The power to protect such rights is exercised by the
legislature by virtue of its police power. The health, comfort,
safety and welfare of society are involved and it becomes neces-
sary that the rights, duties and liabilities of the owners and users
of vehicles as between them and the traveling public should be
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declared. Radnor Township v. Bell, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. i; Christy
vs. Elliot, 216 Ill. 3!.
The automobile is a very recent invention. In appearance it
presents a striking difference from other vehicles. It has a
shape and form peculiar to itself. Moreover while in motion it
is accompanied by the noise of its propelling engines. Its use is
limited, by reason of the recentness of its invention, principally
to the larger cities, and in the smaller towns and rural districts
horses have not as yet become accustomed to its strange appear-
ance and noise. Then, too, they are often of very great weight
and are capable of being driven at a very high rate of speed,
some reaching a speed of over a mile a minute. And the tend-
ency is to drive them at an exceedingly high speed in reckless
disregard of the rights of others. Great knowledge and skill are
required in such cases to render such driving free from danger,
and as a rule such knowledge is not possessed by the driver. So
the legislature in order to reduce the danger to a minimum has
assumed control of the use by them of the streets. People v.
Schneider, 103 N. W. (Mich.) 172; Radnor Township v. Bell
(supra); Commonwealth v. Boyd, t88 Mass. 79; People v. Mac-
Williams, 86 N Y. Supp. 
357.
In order to enforce such laws it is necessary that the automo-
bile may be easily and quickly identified. A great many auto-
mobiles are similar in appearance, and this, together with the
fact that the face of the operator is partially, and sometimes
wholly, concealed, makes it impossible to distinguish the driver
or the machine. And so long as identification is impossible, the
laws may be violated at the pleasure of the driver. So the leg-
islature requires the owner or operator to place in a conspicuous
place on his automobile a tag with a number printed thereon in
very large figures. In case the law is violated, the number of
the machine can be easily ascertained and by examination of the
record of numbers, the name of the owner and operator may be
found out, and penalties inflicted Knowing this, the driver,
through fear of discovery and punishment, is deterred from vio-
lating the laws. People v. Schneider (supra).
The nature and extent of the the control exercised by the
legislature or by the municipalities by virtue of power delegated
by the legislature to them may be seen by an examination of the
statutes and ordinances enacted. Such statutes and ordinances
are classified in a note in r L. R. A. (N. S.) 215 as follows: (i)
Registration, numbering, license, tax. (2) Regulations as to
speed and safety appliances. (3) Prohibited hours and places.
(4) Regulation of automobiles used for hire. (5) Restrictions
as to transportation of gasolene carried by automobiles. For
cases involving the above mentioned, i L. R. A. (N. S.) 215.
It is insisted that such statutes are unconstitutional in that
they discriminate against automobiles, in that they limit and
restrict the use of them in the public highway; that drivers of
automobiles are entitled to the same rights and privileges in the
use of the street, as drivers of other vehicles. The courts, how-
ever, hold this to be a valid exercise by the legislature of its
392
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police power and that the act is uniform inasmuch as it affects
all members of the same class alike. Christy v. Elliot (supra).
In some statutes it is provided that the rule as to registra-
tion, etc., shall not apply to a person manufacturing or dealing
in automobiles or motor vehicles, except those for his own private
use. In such cases it is contended that such provisions exclude
the dealer and manufacturer from the operation of the statute,
and that, therefore, the law is unconstitutional, it being class
legislation. The courts hold such not to be the case. They hold
that the statute is uniform as it applies to all vehicles used upon
the public highway, for private use or for hire, and does not
apply to machines while they are kept in stock for sale and not
so used. Commonwealtht v. Densmore, 29 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 217;
People v. Mac Williams (supra).
Nor is the general act invalid because it fails to provide for
taxing the vehicles of non-residents who habitually use the
streets of the city. Kersey v. City of Terre Haute, 16 1 Ind. 47 1.
It is objected that the legislature by giving a municipality
power to regulate, does not thereby give it power to license.
The court holds that "the grant of authority to accomplish a
certain purpose carries with it authority to use any proper and
lawful means without which that purpose cannot be accomp-
lished," and as the speed of automobiles cannot otherwise be
regulated, such power to license was necessarily granted with the
power to regulate. People v. Schneider (supra).
Nor is the license fee a tax, placing a double burden of taxa-
tion upon the owner, and therefore rendering the act unconsti-
tutional. Unwen v. State, 64 Atl. (N. J.) 163; Commonwealth v.
Boyd (supra); but see City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 442.
A rather peculiar objection to the statute regulating speed is
that speed means action, and is directly opposed to stopping,
which is inaction. And the stopping a machine does not come
within the meaning of regulation of its speed. The court held,
however, that regulating the stopping of a machine was auxiliary
to the object of regulating the speed, and that the act was not
void as embracing more than the one subject expressed in the
title. Christy v. Elliot (supra.)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-SLEEPING CARS
One more instance of our modern haphazard legislation,
which is the result of acceding to the clamor of special interests
without careful study of the whole situation, is found in the
recent Wisconsin statute declared unconstitutional in the case of
State v. Redmon, 114 N. W. (Wis.) 137. This statute was en-
titled, "An act-relating to the health and comfort of occupants
of sleeping car berths;" and provided that whenever a person
paid for the use of a double lower berth in a sleeping car, he
should have the right to direct whether the upper berth should
be left open or closed unless the upper berth was actually occu-
pied by some other person; and the proprietor of the car and the
person in charge of it should comply with such direction.
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As liberty and property are so carefully protected by express
provisions in our constitutions, it is natural that most of the
attacks on these rights should be made under the guise of an
exercise of the state's police power. This is because of the fact
that our courts have ever held to the doctrine that the police
power is so obviously essential to the public welfare that it is
presumed that the framers of our constitutions did not intend
to prohibit its exercise where reasonably necessary therefor,
though such exercise might invade the scope, viewing the
language in the literal sense, of some of the fundamental prohi-
bitions protecting liberty and property. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.
S. I3; People v. Ewer, 14y N. Y. 129; Lochner v. New York, 198
U. S. 54. Here then was a loop hole in the constitution for the
exponents of class legislation. As a result the police power has
been stretched so far at times that it has been wittily defined as
the power to pass unconstitutional laws.
No doubt the reason why the exercise of the police power has
been so persistently abused is because the courts in defining it
have fixed its limits in variable terms or else have admitted, as
did Judge Brewer in State v. Kansas City. etc., R. Co., 32 Fed.
Rep. 723, "that no one knows its limits." Such must neces-
sarily be the case from its very nature. The police power is not
a fixed quantity because it is the expression of social, economic,
and political conditions which are ever changing with the times.
Yet no one denies that it has limits. In the first place we begin
with the proposition that under its police power the state can
legislate to promote the public health, safety, morals, and gen-
eral welfare; and furthermore that when such legislation inter-
feres with an individual's liberty and property, the federal con-
stitution offers no protection. But thus broadly stated, the
principle would be broad enough to include almost any legisla-
tion Therefore we find the courts attempting to hedge this
power about with various limitations. In doing this they have
recognized the fact that to curb the police power by fixed or
rigid rules would be to destroy its very purpose and future use-
fulness. Therefore the limits have been fixed in such general and
variable terms as: "that its purpose must affect the public gener-
ally;" and "that the means used are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals " What then is meant by these terms, "public gener-
ally," "reasonably necessary," and "unduly oppressive ?" It is
impossible to exactly define them. At most our courts have
merely given us a mass of individual decisions applying these
variable tests tb the facts in each individual case.
Thus the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in determining the un-
constitutionality of this statute regulating the use of sleeping
car berths has given us another illustrative case as to the limits
of the state's police power. In the title of the act the legisla-
ture expressly stated that its purpose was to "promote health."
But the court held that though such a statement in the title of
an act was evidence of its real purpose yet such was not conclu-
sive because it is a judicial function to define the proper sub-
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jects for the exercise of police power. Although this doctrine
has been repeatedly reaffirmed since so clearly enunciated by
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch (U. S.),
178, yet social and class legislation is continuously appearing
headed with titles declaring its purpose to be to promote the
public health.In considering whether or not the statute under considera-
tion was one which affected the public generally, the court de-
cided that it was not because it gave the person to be benefited
an option. He could have the upper berth thrown back or not
at pleasure. The court was clearly right here because it is con-
trary to the whole theory of the exercise of the police power in
protection of health, that the recipient of the intended benefit
should receive it or not as he wishes. Imagine a statute for-
bidding factory owners from employing women more than ten
hours a day unless such women wished to work that long. It is
absurd. The benefit is not intended to accrue to the individual
as such but to the public at large through the individual. In re
Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; Holden v. Hardy, x69 U. S. 366.
The court furthermore decided that even though such a
statute did promote to some degree the public health, yet the
benefit obtained thereby was very slight in proportion to the
restraint and requirement imposed upon the owners of sleeping
cars. Therefore the law was an unwarranted interference with
property rights. In reaching this conclusion the court applied
the recognized test of "reasonableness." In fact this word,
"reasonableness," is the keystone of the whole doctrine of police
power. The final question asked by our courts about any police
power legislation is as to whether or not it is reasonable.Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334; Health Department v. Rector, 145
N. Y. 32; Minneapolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, i86 U. S. 268;
Southern Ry. Co. v. McNeil, 155 Fed. 756. But what is unreason-
able at one time may be reasonable at another. Circumstances
change and public opinion, which must eventually find ex-
pression in the opinions of our judges, also changes. Hence the
law of police power is variable and yields to the changing con-
ditions of society. We see greater power in this respect readily
conceded to the most democratic of governments to-day than
despotic governments would have dared to claim in former times.
This great broadening of the scope of the state's police power
in recent years has been a convenient cloak under which to rush
through our state legislatures much poorly considered and un-
duly oppressive class legislation. The Wisconsin case under
discussion is one more authority to help stem this tide of impul-
sive and ill-conceived legislation.
EFFECT OF FAILURE OF FOREIGN CORPORATION TO
COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Can a foreign corporation, which has not complied with the
requirements of the statutes of another state, recover from an
agent in that state on his promisory note? The Supreme Court
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of Minnesota has answered this question in the negative, in
Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Knap p, 12 N. W. 989, mainly on the ground
that the broad and controlling principles of public policy should
not be subverted to that rule of private law which forbids an
agent to question the right of his principal to money collected
by him for his principal.
The fundamental proposition that a corporation has no exist-
ence beyond the limits of the sovereignty which created it, is
well settled and admits of no question. Having only this exist-
ence and no absolute right of recognition in other states, but de-
pending for such recognition and enforcement of its contracts
upon their assent, it follows as a matter of course, that such
assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those
states may think proper to impose ; they may exclude the
foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to
particular localities, or they may exact such security for the per-
formance of its contracts with their citizens as in their judg-
ment will best promote the public interest. The whole matter
rests in their discretion. These statutory provisions are police
regulations intended to protect people and property in one state
against spurious and irresponsible companies and it is plainly
their intent to compel all such companies to comply with local
laws and submit to our courts. Such statutes make compliance
with them a condition precedent to entering into lawful con-
tracts in that state In re Comstock, 3 Sawyer, 218; Seainans v.
Christian Bros. Mill Co., 66 Minn. 205.
There is a general proposition that if a foreign corporation
fails to comply with the laws of a state, such as filing a certifi-
cate of the amount of the corporation's capital, or recording the
appointment of an authorized agent on whom process may be
served, the contracts which are made are not void, but action
thereon is merely suspended until compliance with the statutes.
This interpretation rests on the theory that the object of these
laws is rather to induce the observance of the conditions, than to
accomplish the forfeiture of a right of action belonging to a for-
eign corporation. Carson Rand Co. v. Stern, 129 Mo. 387; Goddard
v. CrefieldMills, 75 Fed. 818; Nat'l Aut'l. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pursell,
to Allen, 231. But it is interesting to note that Minnesota has taken
the contrary view, with the result that a foreign corporation which
has not complied with the statutes, at the time the contract was
consummated, will not be allowed to maintain an action on the
contract even though the requirements are met after the suit is
begun. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Peimeisl, 85 Minn. X 2 T. Minne-
sota has evidently favored the strict construction of such statutes,
as being for the best interests of its citizens and tending to pre-
vent litigation on contracts made in disregard of the law.
The defendant in this suit had ordered goods of one of the
company's agents and it was found that he himself was an agent
with certain clearly defined powers and duties. For these goods
the defendant had given his promissory note and the plaintiff
sued to recover thereon. The defense, the truth of which was not
contested, was that the corporation had not complied with the
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laws of Minnesota, which would prohibit it from maintaining
the action, and the note was held unenforceable. That the
agent had in turn sold the goods does not appear, but the court
said the result would be the same, whether the suit were on a
promissory note or for money had and received to the use of the
principal.
The authority most nearly in point, and that relied upon by
the plaintiff, is United States Express Co. v. Lucas, 36 Ind. 361,
which allowed the principal to recover under similar circum-
stances. In the course of the opinion, the court observed: "We
doubt very much whether the legislature intended, in the enact-
ment of the statute in question, to produce or sanction any such
consequences as that the agent, after having received the money,
and after the transaction between the principal and third per-
sons was completed, should be allowed to repudiate the agency
and keep the money, applying it to his own use. The obliga-
tion of the agent to account for the money is separate and dis-
tinct from the contracts of the company with third persons,
which were the subject matters of the statute. To hold that
the agent is not bound to account for the money is to sanction
an act of the grossest dishonesty, and bad faith on the part of
the agent, without the accomplishment of any equivalent benefit
to any one, or to the public. 'The contract of the agent to pay
is not immediately connected with the illegal transaction; but it
grows out of the receipt of the money for the use of the principal
who may recover. Story on Agency, § 347." This seems to sug-
gest that the illegality existed as between the corporation and
third persons, and not as between the corporation and
its agents; but where the statute expressly says, as does the
Minnesota statute, that without compliance with the named re-
quirements, no suit may be maintained on any demand, whether
arising out of contract or tort, the result would seem to be clear
that as to the corporation, there is no distinction between
agents or third persons.
The court said further: "We think the agent is estopped to
dispute the principal's title to money which he has received for
him. A tenant cannot dispute the title of the landlord-a bailee
cannot dispute the title of the bailor; especially he cannot set
up title in himself. Why should an agent be allowed to place
himself in a position of hostility to his principal and himself
claim that which he has received for him?" But this question is
answered by the Minnesota court thus: "The question is not
what the agent, as between himself and his principal, should be
permitted to do, but what the delinquent corporation is per-
mitted to do, by the laws of the state."
There are numerous authorities which show that when the
principal employs an agent, he contracts both for his zeal in the
employment and vigilance to the exclusive advantage of the
employer; so that the agent cannot make himself an adverse
party. Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall 70; Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39
Barb. 140. There is also a distinction, made in England, as to
the actual receipt of the money by the agent; the rule being
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that if the money has'been actually paid to the agent, the prin-
cipal may recover-not because it completes an illegal contract,
but when the contract is at an end the agent, whose liability
arises solely from the fact of having received money for another's
use, can have no pret6nse to refain it. But if the agent has not
actually received the money, but has debited himself with the
amount in his account, to pay it to his employer, that will not
enable the latter to support an action for money had and received
to his use. Paley on Agency, p. 62. This distinction does not
seem to be so carefully drawn in this country, but United States
Express Co. v. Lucas, supra, tends to support the first part of the
rule, although this would not be approved by the case under
review.
A more recent text book writer has said: "If the main object
for which the agent is employed is legal, yet if by the terms of
the contract, and as a part of it, the agent is to act in an illegal
character or manner in another part of the transaction, the
whole contract is contaminated thereby, and the agent can
recover no compensation even for his legal acts under the con-
tract. Neither can the principal enforce any of his obligations;
for the law will not assist any-persons in evading the obligations
imposed upon the whole community to conform to its direction
and prohibitions, and as between the principal and his agent,
the guilt is deemed to be equal. In pari delicto, potior est con-
ditio defendentis. Therefore they must trust exclusively to the
personal faith of each other as to the fulfilment of their mutual
stipulations in-illegal transactions." Story on Agency, § 195; 344.
That the Minnesota court has taken the stronger position on
this question, we feel sure; not that agents should be allowed
to retain moneys justly and morally belonging to their principals,
but that, since statutes of this kind are neither onerous nor
oppressive, corporations should not first entirely neglect to com-
ply therewith, and then endeavor to do the very thing the law
has forbidden. Compliance with these statutes is a mark of
good faith, which opens the doors of the courts to the painstak-
ing, and justly closes them to the careless and delinquent.
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